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Abstract
District of Columbia v. 
Heller Heller
INTRODUCTION
Has originalism won? It’s easy to think so, judging from some of the 
reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision last Term in 
.1 The Court held that the District of Columbia could neither ban 
possession of handguns nor require that all other firearms be either unloaded and 
disassembled or guarded by a trigger lock. In finding for the first time in the 
Court’s history that a gun control law violated the Second Amendment, Justice 
Scalia’s opinion for the 5-4 majority appeared to be a sterling exemplar of 
originalism, the method of constitutional interpretation that he has helped to 
popularize. More surprising to most observers, the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Stevens also seemed to be in the originalist tradition.2 Hence the claim advanced 
by some in the decision’s wake that “we are all originalists now.”3
                                                  
† Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; J.D., 2005, Yale Law School. I 
would like to thank Mitchell Berman, Ben Correa, Hayley Horowitz, Martha Morgan, Elora 
Mukherjee, and the staff of the for helpful comments and 
suggestions.
1 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2 . at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3 , Seth Barrett Tillman & Steven G. Calabresi, Debate, 
Heller
†
High Water? The Future of Originalism
Jamal Greene
This Article considers the future of originalism in the wake 
of the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in 
. It argues that, although is in many ways a triumph 
for proponents of originalism, it might also represent a high water 
mark for the doctrine and for the political movement that supports 
it. There is little reason to believe that the cases of relative first 
impression that originalism feeds on will be readily available in 
the near future, and the politics of the Court and of the country do 
not augur the appointment of additional originalist judges. These 
observations recommend that progressive advocates focus on 
availing themselves of the nation’s ethical shift to themes of 
change and mutual responsibility, so as to emphasize the 
Constitution’s dynamic future rather than its static past.
District of Columbia v. 
Heller Heller
Harvard Law & Policy Review
Id
See, e.g. The Great Divorce: The 
Current Understanding of Separation of Powers and the Original Meaning of the Incompatibility 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1413801
2
If that claim is true, it is profoundly important to the future of 
constitutional law. Originalists believe that judges generally should prioritize the 
original understanding of constitutional provisions over contemporary 
understandings that avail themselves of social and intellectual progress. Since this 
is not how constitutional law has been made for much of our history, a serious 
commitment by the Supreme Court to originalism would destabilize some of our 
most familiar and cherished political traditions. If the claim is not true, then 
constitutional lawyers, particularly progressives, must take care to separate the 
rhetoric of originalists from the impact of originalism on actual constitutional 
cases.
This Essay argues that the claim is not true and then some. Not only are 
we not originalists now, but very few of us are originalists . Of course, a 
handful of judges and many legal academics (more than ever, perhaps) maintain a 
theoretical devotion to some version of originalism. But in practice, originalism is 
most useful in two categories of cases. The first category comprises cases of 
constitutional first impression. But now that has laid the foundations of 
Second Amendment doctrine, this category describes a virtual null set. The 
second category includes those issues that the political movement behind the 
recent originalist revival has tagged as vulnerable to attack on originalist grounds: 
abortion, religious establishment, limitations on capital punishment, and so forth. 
The problem here is that the doctrinal cobwebs surrounding these issues are too 
thick for originalism’s blade. So long as the only originalists of influence feel 
constrained by stare decisis, originalism will remain more rallying cry than 
decision procedure. 
Blurring these distinctions has been vital to the strategy that has made 
originalism relevant to our constitutional politics. Recognizing them will likewise 
be vital to progressives’ efforts to commandeer those politics in favor of their own 
constitutional ends. This Essay describes the past and present of originalism in 
order to glimpse its future. Part I defines originalism and discusses its history in 
                                                                                                                                          
, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBR A 134, 135 (2008), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=19
pdfs/GreatDivorce.pdf; Dave Kopel, , 
HUMAN EVEN TS, June 27, 2008, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=27229; on a 
First Read, Posting of Dale Carpenter to the Volokh Conspiracy, 
http://volokh.com/posts/1214514180.shtml (June 26, 2008, 17:03 EST); Adam Winkler, 
, 56 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 7, on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library) (citing Linda Greenhouse’s reference to as a “triumph of 
originalism”); Dahlia Lithwick, 
, SLATE, Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2204377/ 
(“The liberals and conservatives [in ] took turns trying to outdo one another as ‘textualists’ 
and ‘originalists’ and ‘strict constructionists.’”).
all now
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case law and political rhetoric. That history exposes originalism as an otherwise 
plausible interpretive methodology that has been radicalized and weaponized by 
conservative activists over the last three decades. Part II discusses the Court’s 
opinion in and explains why originalism will not likely be relevant to the 
doctrinal exposition of the Second Amendment going forward. reveals 
both the potency and the weaknesses of originalism. The opinion could not have 
been written thirty years ago, but it is difficult to conceive of an analogously 
originalist opinion being written anytime soon. Part III elaborates several reasons 
why. Originalist judges—particularly those who feel relatively unconstrained by 
precedent—are unlikely appointees to the Supreme Court for the foreseeable 
future. Moreover, the sorts of legal issues that the Court’s agenda will likely 
comprise are poor candidates for originalist appeals. In short, even if is a 
triumph for originalism, it might also be its high water mark. Part III concludes, 
then, with a prescription for progressive lawyers to reemphasize the 
Constitution’s dynamic potential and to let originalism fade, for the moment, into 
history.
I. THE HISTORY OF ORIGINALISM
The historian of originalism must proceed with an ironic caution. 
Originalism means different things to different people and in different times. 
Deciphering what one means by “originalism” first requires deciding whether it 
refers to the views of politicians or constitutional lawyers, to academic theory or 
judicial practice, to the 1980s or the present decade, and to law or linguistics. 
Each combination of points along those spectra describes a different idea with a 
distinct intellectual history. The irony within the caution becomes apparent when 
one considers the little common ground among most originalists: that the meaning 
of the Constitution is fixed at a historical moment in time and is available to 
interpreters. Nevertheless, if we marry that view to the corollary that judges in 
constitutional cases should make their best efforts to discern and apply that fixed 
meaning, we have a working definition nearly adequate to the present task.4
An originalist opinion is not merely one in which the outcome of the case 
is consistent with the original understanding. By that definition, virtually all 
judges and many—if not most—opinions would qualify: emphasis on consistency 
with historical understandings is a relevant and persuasive form of American 
                                                  
4 The many efforts to construct a definitive taxonomy of originalism have been heroic 
and, inevitably, contradictory. , Daniel A. Farber, 
, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1086–1087 (1989); Mitchell N. Berman, 
, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8–37 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, 2–12 
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4constitutional argument.5 Rather, an originalist opinion is one whose result is 
compelling solely or primarily because of that consistency. And an originalist 
judge is one who is committed to originalist opinions, who believes that such 
opinions would predominate in the best of worlds.
An additional distinction is necessary to make the historical inquiry 
intelligible. Most academic lawyers draw a sharp line between original public 
meaning and original subjective intent. The Framers of the Constitution had 
various expectations as to the meaning and scope of particular constitutional 
provisions; those expectations might not only have differed internally—between 
Alexander Hamilton and Charles Pinckney, say—but might have diverged from 
how the Constitution’s would have reasonably understood those 
provisions. Most academic originalists insist that the latter, the original public 
meaning of the Constitution, is the relevant object of interpretation because the 
Constitution became legally binding through the actions of its ratifiers, not its 
framers.6
There is little evidence that even well-educated and legally trained 
members of the public appreciate the distinction between original meaning and 
original intent,7 but it is difficult to assess the status of originalism at the nation’s 
founding without confronting this difference. The members of the founding 
generation were not original-intent originalists, as that category is now understood. 
As H. Jefferson Powell detailed in his classic treatment, Revolutionary views on 
constitutional interpretation arose from a competing set of norms—an anti-
interpretation bias derived from British Protestantism and the Enlightenment, and 
the evolutionary norms of a common law approach to statutory interpretation.8
Neither of those traditions looked favorably upon vesting the subjective intentions 
of statutory drafters with legal authority. To be sure, one frequently finds 
reference to the “intention of the lawgiver” and similar formulations in eighteenth 
and nineteenth century British and American judicial opinions and treatises. But 
                                                  
5 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITU TION AL FATE 9–24 (1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
, 100 HAR V. L. REV. 1189, 1198–
99 (1987). 
6 ROBER T H. BO RK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERIC A: THE POLITIC AL SEDUC TION OF THE 
LAW 143-44 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, , 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2867, 
2871 (2007).
7 Jamal Greene, , 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 687–88 (2009) (describing the 
public reaction to , much of which conflated original intent and original meaning).
8 H. Jefferson Powell, , 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 888–902 (1985).
audience
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5that intention was generally considered intrinsic to the text itself; it was not to be 
gleaned from extrinsic sources such as legislative debate or drafting notes.9
By contrast, the intellectual presuppositions of the Revolutionary 
generation fit quite comfortably with the notion that the original of the 
enacted text should be dispositive. The Framers were what one might call dated 
textualists; they intended the express meaning of the Constitution’s words to hold 
sway for later interpreters, regardless of social change.10
That the founding generation shared this interpretive premise with many 
modern originalists does not in itself link the present originalism movement to 
ancient hermeneutic tradition. Many of the great contemporary debates between 
originalists and their opponents do not reflect differences over original meaning 
so much as differences over present-day application. As Ronald Dworkin 
observed in his well known colloquy with Justice Scalia, many of the 
Constitution’s trouble spots, such as “cruel and unusual punishment” and “due 
process of law,” refer to principles that the founding generation—drafters and 
audience alike—would have considered compatible with dynamic application.11
There is little evidence, for example, that a late eighteenth century reasonable 
person would have understood “liberty” as incapable of 
encompassing a right to have an abortion.12
Nonetheless, we should hesitate before ascribing to founding-era 
Americans a Dworkinian view of the the level of generality at which future 
interpreters should understand constitutional text. Those Americans would not 
have contemplated—nor can they be presumed to have consented to—an evolving 
Constitution that safeguards an ever expanding set of individual rights against the 
government. The disputes over individual rights that form Dworkin’s paradigm 
cases were largely foreign to the docket of the early Court. Most of the Bill of 
Rights was inapplicable to the states until well into the twentieth century and, as 
Mark Graber writes, the federal law docket of the antebellum Supreme Court was 
largely restricted to “politically uncontroversial land cases, technical questions of 
                                                  
9 PHILIP A. HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUD ICIAL DU TY 298–301 (2008); Powell, note 
8, at 894–96. JOSEPH STOR Y, COMMEN TARIES ON THE CONSTITU TION OF THE UN ITED 
STATES § 400 (Carolina Acad. Press 1987) (1833).
10 Philip A. Hamburger, , 88 
MICH. L. REV. 239, 325 (1989). I borrow the “dated” formulation from Ronald Dworkin, who calls 
Justice Scalia’s brand of originalism by the same name. Ronald Dworkin, , 
AN TON IN SC ALIA, A MATTER  OF IN TERPRETATION: FEDER AL COUR TS AN D THE LAW 115, 121 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
11 Dworkin, note 10, at 119–23.
12 Jack M. Balkin, , 24 CONST. COMMEN T. 291, 311–
12 (2007). I leave aside the question of whether the relevant audience belongs to the original 
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6federal jurisdiction, and other issues of similar political insignificance.”13 In that 
context, John Marshall’s famous dictum that the Constitution is “intended to 
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of 
human affairs”14 is best understood as counseling judicial restraint, not judicially 
engineered constitutional adaptation. 
Indeed, Marshall’s statements in other cases seem sympathetic with 
modern originalist premises. In declaring section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
unconstitutional in , Marshall wrote, “The constitution is 
either a superior, paramount law, , or it is on a 
level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the 
legislature shall please to alter it.”15 Later, dissenting in , 
Marshall defended his view that the Contracts Clause should apply to prospective 
as well as retrospective legislation:
To say that the intention of the [Constitution] must prevail; that 
this intention must be collected from its words; that its words are to 
be understood in that sense in which they are generally used by 
those for whom the instrument was intended; that its provisions are 
neither to be restricted into insignificance, nor extended to objects 
not comprehended in them, nor contemplated by its framers;—is to 
repeat what has been already said more at large, and is all that can 
be necessary.16
Justice Scalia could hardly have said it better himself. Similar expressions of the 
view that the Constitution should be understood in contemporary times as it was 
understood at the founding can be found in numerous other nineteenth century 
cases.17 It is for this reason that many originalists, including Scalia and Robert 
Bork, have concluded that as originalists they are engaged in a project of 
constitutional restoration rather than a radical departure from settled practice.18
To whatever extent a version of originalism was the settled practice in the 
nineteenth century, it began to be unsettled around the turn of the twentieth 
                                                  
13 Mark A. Graber, , 53 
VAND. L. REV. 73, 116 (2000).
14 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
15 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).
16 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 332 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
17 , Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 558 (1895); Ex Parte 
Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857); 
South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448–49 (1905) (“The Constitution is a written 
instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted it means now.”).
18 BORK, note 6, at 143; Antonin Scalia, , 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 849, 852–54 (1989).
Marbury v. Madison
unchangeable by ordinary means
Ogden v. Saunders
Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional Development
See, e.g.
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7century. Progressive era academics such as Abbott Lawrence Lowell and, later, 
Woodrow Wilson analogized government to an organism, rejecting the 
Newtonian notion of government as a machine.19 Language comparing the 
Constitution to a living creature peppers the judicial opinions of Justices Holmes 
and Brandeis and the writings of Benjamin Cardozo.20 Those judges, along with 
Harlan Fiske Stone, formed the intellectual core of the New Deal Court that 
eventually freed states to pursue labor regulations and permitted President 
Roosevelt and his Democratic Congresses to revolutionize the administrative state. 
The most prominent originalist opinions of the 1930s—Justice Sutherland’s 
writings in 21 and 
22—were in dissent.
Originalism remained firmly on the margins of constitutional law for the 
next four decades. With the notable exception of Hugo Black, no justice of the 
Supreme Court and few prominent legal academics were self-avowed originalists
for most of that period. That is not to say that there were no Supreme Court 
majority opinions that relied on the authority of original intent, nor is it to say that 
members of the bench and bar considered the original understanding of 
constitutional provisions irrelevant to the interpretive exercise. There would 
otherwise have been no need for the Court to request additional briefing on the 
original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause after the first argument in 
.23 But in conspicuously disregarding evidence that 
the Congress that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment did not anticipate it being 
read to mandate school desegregation,24 the Court foreshadowed an era in 
which a contrary original understanding proved no significant obstacle to results 
that the Justices believed fundamental justice required.
The Warren Court had its critics, of course, prominently including Felix 
Frankfurter disciples such as Alexander Bickel and Philip Kurland,25 but attacks 
                                                  
19 A. LAWR ENCE LOWELL, ESSAYS ON  GO VERNMEN T 1–4 (1889); WOODROW
WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR  THE EM ANC IPATION OF THE GENERO US ENERG IES O F A 
PEOPLE 46–48 (1913); MICH AEL KAMMEN, A MACH INE TH AT WOULD  GO OF ITSELF: THE 
CONSTITU TION IN AMER IC AN CULTU RE 19–20 (1986).
20 , Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.); Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472–73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); BENJAM IN N. CARDO ZO,
THE NATU RE OF THE JUD ICIAL PROCESS 17 (photo. reprint 1998) (1921).
21 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding a moratorium on mortgage foreclosures against a 
Contracts Clause challenge).
22 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage statute and overruling Adkins v. 
Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
23 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972–73 (1953).
24 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
25 ALEX ANDER M. B ICKEL, TH E SUPREME COUR T AND THE ID EA OF PROGRESS 45 47
(Yale Univ. Press 1978) (1970); PHILIP KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITU TION, AND  THE 
WARREN COUR T, at xx xxii (1970).
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish









8on its work did not typically take originalist form prior to the publication of Raoul 
Berger’s in 1976. Richard Nixon campaigned in 1968 
on the promise of appointing “strict constructionists” to the Court,26 but by that 
term he meant only that he sought “men that interpret the law and don’t try to 
make the law.”27 So defined, “strict constructionism” begs the question and is 
therefore useless jurisprudentially. Originalism was far more promising. Although 
Berger described himself as a liberal, his book’s sharp, hyperbolic critiques of the 
Warren Court for diverging from the original intentions of the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment dramatically reinvigorated the academic debate over 
originalism. 
Armed with a coherent judicial philosophy and abetted by the election of 
Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980, the originalism-promoting Federalist 
Society was formed in 1982 and the conservative Center for Judicial Studies 
opened the following year. The Center published an influential bimonthly journal 
called , which would “subscribe[] to the maxim that Rule of Law 
demands adherence to the original intent of the Constitution.”28 On the left, 
scholars such as Powell, John Hart Ely, and Paul Brest attacked originalism as 
simplistic, prone to anachronistic thinking, inconsistent with the text and history 
of the document itself, and dangerously sanguine about the capacity of judges to 
do the work of historians.29
The debate reached a thunderous crescendo in 1987 over then-Circuit 
Judge Robert Bork’s failed Supreme Court nomination. At the start of Reagan’s 
second term, Edwin Meese III had taken over as Attorney General. Almost 
immediately, in a series of speeches, Meese announced that the Justice 
Department would devote itself to “a jurisprudence of original intention.”30
Consistent with that program, Bork refused during his confirmation hearings to 
back down from his views that not only ,31 but also 
32 and 33 (among other staples) were incorrectly 
                                                  
26 THOM AS M. KECK, THE MOST AC TIVIST SUPREME COUR T IN H ISTOR Y 111–13 
(2004).
27 at 112.
28 James McClellan, , BENCHMARK: A BIMON TH LY REPOR T ON THE 
CONSTITU TION, Fall 1983, at 1.
29 JOHN HAR T ELY, DEMOCR AC Y AND  DISTRUST: A THEO R Y OF JUD IC IAL REVIEW
11 41 (1980); Paul Brest, , 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 229–34 (1980); Powell, note 8, at 885–88.
30 Edwin Meese, III, 
, 27 S. TEX . L. REV. 455, 465 (1986) (emphasis omitted).
31 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32 318 U.S. 479 (1965).
33 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
Government by Judiciary
Benchmark
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9decided or reasoned.34 Notice that by this point in our story the originalists’ cause 
had become unmoored from that of the prudentialists—those who, like Bickel and 
Kurland, opposed the Warren Court for proceeding too dramatically, too 
haphazardly, and without sufficient attention to settled expectations or public 
support.35 By 1987, originalists had little affection for stare decisis. And there was 
sense in this.  The Warren Court had altered the status quo of constitutional law; 
as cases like , ,36 and 37 developed 
cultural resonance and social reliance, the argument from continuity, once so 
powerful, became less available to the originalism movement that those cases 
spawned.
Relatively overlooked during the dust-up over the Bork nomination (and 
the controversial elevation of William Rehnquist to Chief Justice the year prior) 
was the 1986 nomination and appointment of Justice Scalia to the Court. Perhaps 
no one bears greater responsibility for the current prominence of originalism in 
case law and political and legal discourse than Scalia. It is frequently remarked 
that Scalia has suffered from the sharpness of his dissenting pen, which has been 
blamed for his inability to build coalitions among his colleagues and in particular 
for his alienation from Justice O’Connor.38 But that very sharpness has conspired 
with Scalia’s equally witty academic writings, his frequent lectures, his feistiness 
during oral argument, his affable personality off the bench, and the prominence of 
his pulpit to create a cult of personality around him.39 Rush Limbaugh has called 
Scalia the person “whose brain I would like if I didn’t have mine.”40 Charles 
Krauthammer has written, “Some people have John Grisham. Others Tom Clancy. 
Not me. For sheer power, stiletto prose and verbal savagery, I’ll take Antonin 
Scalia.”41 In 2004, former Republican lobbyist Kevin Ring published a 
sycophantic compilation of Scalia’s most memorable dissents entitled 
;42 the 
                                                  
34
, 100th Cong. 115, 184 85, 286 87 
(1987).
35 Indeed, Kurland surprised many in opposing Bork’s nomination to the Court.
36 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
37 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
38 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COUR T: THE PER SON ALITIES AND RIVALRIES TH AT 
DEFINED AM ERIC A 199 200 (2007); JEFFREY TOO BIN, THE NINE: IN SIDE THE SECRET WO RLD OF 
THE SUPREME COUR T 55 56, 191 92, 317 18 (2007).
39 Greene, note 7, at 710.
40 Rush Limbaugh, , THE LIMB AUGH 
LETTER (Dec. 2005), http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/menu/limfunoriginalism.guest.html.
41 Charles Krauthammer, , WASH . POST, Jun. 30, 2000, at A31.
42 KEVIN R ING, SC ALIA DISSEN TS: WR ITINGS O F THE SUPREME COUR T’S WITTIEST, MOST 
OUTSPOKEN JUSTICE (2004). The inside cover reads: “Brilliant. Colorful. Visionary. Tenacious. 
Griswold Reynolds v. Sims Miranda v. Arizona
Scalia 
Dissents: Writings of the Supreme Court’s Wittiest, Most Outspoken Justice
See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary
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book was well received in conservative circles.43 George W. Bush called Scalia 
(along with Clarence Thomas) one of the two justices he most admired. Even 
Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid has said that Justice Scalia would 
be an acceptable Chief Justice because “I disagree with many of the results that he 
arrives at, but his reason[s] for arriving at those results are very hard to dispute.”44
Scalia has been originalism’s social entrepreneur , and his 
mark can be seen not just in politics and conservative popular culture but in the 
legal academy and, most recently, in actual Court opinions. Justice Scalia’s 
relatively early emphasis on original meaning rather than original intent provided, 
for some, a decisive rebuttal to the criticisms of Brest and Powell, and it has 
helped to drive the latter formulation to the fringes of the legal academy.45 And 
although Scalia’s originalist appeals were usually in dissent during his early years 
on the Court,46 the majority has used originalist arguments to overrule 
longstanding precedents or to alter settled understandings several times in recent 
years. 
For example, Justice Scalia wrote for the 5–4 majority in 
that, based in part on the original assumptions of the founding era, the 
federal government could not direct state executive officers to enforce federal law 
without the state’s consent.47 More broadly, seemed to depart from the 
post-New Deal consensus that the Tenth Amendment was not an independent 
obstacle to actions otherwise within the power of Congress.48 Likewise, in 
, the Court held that the history and structure of the Constitution—
“confirmed” by the Tenth Amendment—prevented the federal government from 
subjecting non-consenting states to private damages suits in their own courts for 
violations of federal law.49 In , the Court fatally 
undermined its 1990 decision in and revolutionized sentencing 
law with an originalist holding that any fact that increased a defendant’s sentence 
                                                                                                                                          
Witty. Since his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1986, Associate Justice Antonin Scalia has 
been described as all of these things and for good reason.” at inside cover.
43 , NRO Symposium, , NAT’L REV. ON LINE , July 1, 
2005, http://search.nationalreview.com/ (enter “bring a book to the beach” in Search Terms and 
click on Search;  follow “Bring a Book to the Beach” hyperlink).
44 (NBC television broadcast Dec. 5, 2004), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6646457/.
45 Randy E. Barnett, , 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 
620 21 (1999).
46 , McIntyre v. Ohio Elec. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 371 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47 521 U.S. 898, 905 10 (1997).
48 . at 942 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 
123 24 (1941).
49 527 U.S. 706, 713 15 (1999).
par excellence





Apprendi v. New Jersey
Walton v. Arizona
Id.
See, e.g. Bring a Book to the Beach
Meet the Press available at 










beyond the statutory maximum for his underlying offense had to be submitted to a 
jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.50 More recently, in 
, Justice Scalia wrote an opinion holding, based on the original 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause, that testimonial hearsay was inadmissible in 
criminal trials where defendants are not granted the right to confrontation and 
cross-examination.51 overruled the Court’s decision in 
.52
Finally, of course, there is . Justice Scalia’s brazenly originalist 
opinion in that case owes a debt not just to Marshall (as Scalia might have it) but 
to Meese. It could not have been written thirty years earlier; doctrinaire 
originalism was not then a politically acceptable judicial philosophy. The next 
Part discusses the uses of originalism in Second Amendment doctrine. It 
demonstrates that, although itself is pointedly originalist, the future of the 
Second Amendment in constitutional law will likely be firmly doctrinal.
II. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF SELF-DEFENSE
was a test case engineered by lawyers at the libertarian Cato 
Institute and the Institute for Justice in the wake of dramatic shifts in elite opinion 
in favor of an individual rights view of the Second Amendment.53 Dick Heller is a 
libertarian activist and a security guard at the Federal Judicial Center, which sits 
less than a half mile away from the Supreme Court building and serves in part as 
an annex for the Supreme Court’s library. From 1976 until was decided, 
Washington, D.C. had among the strictest gun control laws in the country, 
essentially prohibiting possession of handguns, requiring that all other guns be 
either unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock, and preventing Dick 
Heller from registering a gun for use in his D.C. home.54
Prior to , the Court’s Second Amendment precedents were few and 
far between but were generally unfavorable to the claim that the Amendment 
protects the right of an individual unaffiliated with an organized militia to carry a 
gun for self-defense. The Court held in that the State of Illinois 
could forbid unofficial militias without offense to the Second Amendment, 
although the Court’s statements as to the scope of the Amendment were 
                                                  
50 530 U.S. 466, 482 84 (2000). , 497 U.S. 639 (1990), was later overruled on the 
authority of . Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 603 (2003).
51 541 U.S. 36, 53 54 (2004).
52 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
53 Brian Doherty, , REASON, Dec. 2008, at 
52; Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term Comment: 
Heller, 122 HAR V. L. REV. 191, 226 236 (2008).
54 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008).
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technically dicta.55 More to the point, in the 1939 case of , 
the Court unanimously affirmed the indictment of two men accused of carrying an 
unregistered sawed-off shotgun across state lines in violation of the National 
Firearms Act.56 A whiff of sarcasm attends Justice McReynolds’s statement that 
“[i]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of ‘a 
shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has 
some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated 
militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep 
and bear such an instrument.”57 It wasn’t so much that sawed-off shotguns had no 
military use—of course they do—but that they were the preferred weapons of 
bank robbers, which the defendants Jack Miller and Frank Layton most assuredly 
were.58 As the government’s brief stated, “sawed-off shotguns, sawed-off rifles, 
and machine guns[] clearly have no legitimate use in the hands of private 
individuals but, on the contrary, frequently constitute the arsenal of the gangster 
and the desperado.”59
is a sloppy mess of an opinion. It is best read to hold that, whatever 
the scope of the Second Amendment, it does not protect the right of career 
criminals to arm themselves with their weapons of choice. This is a delicate reed 
on which to build a jurisprudence, but until 2001 every Court of Appeals to 
consider whether the Second Amendment protected the right to bear arms held 
that the scope of the right is moored to militia service.60 The Supreme Court itself 
said in dicta that the federal felon-in-possession statute does not “trench upon any 
constitutionally protected liberties,” and it cited to , which the Court took to 
hold that “the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm 
that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency 
of a well regulated militia.’”61 This all led Justice Stevens to state in his 
dissent that “hundreds of judges have relied on the view of the [Second] 
Amendment we endorsed [in ],” and that the Court itself “affirmed it in 
1980.”62
At its purest, originalism is competitive with stare decisis, and, true to 
form, Justice Scalia dismissed the authority of the line of cases with 
                                                  
55 116 U.S. 252, 264 65 (1886). The Court held, relying on , 
92 U.S. 542 (1875), that the Second Amendment is a restriction on Congress, not the states. at 
265.
56 307 U.S. 174, 183 (1939).
57 . at 178.
58 Brian L. Frye, United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIB ER TY 48, 48 (2008).
59 Brief for the United States at 7, United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (No. 696).
60 , 128 S. Ct. at 2823 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
61 Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980).
62 , 128 S. Ct. at 2823 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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startling alacrity. For our purposes, more significant than his particular reasons for 
rejecting and its progeny is the relatively little weight he placed on those 
precedents and any reliance those cases might have generated. Justice Stevens 
discussed the weight of precedent on the second page of his opinion; Justice 
Scalia’s discussion comes on the twenty-sixth page of his. Scalia devoted the 
preceding twenty-five pages to a thorough examination of the text and history of 
the Second Amendment in an effort to glean the original meaning of what he 
termed the “operative” clause—“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed.”63 So fastidious was Justice Scalia’s devotion to the legal 
authority of the original of this clause that he was unmoved by his own 
concession that the “prefatory” clause—“a well-regulated militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free state”—announces that the Amendment’s original 
was military related.64 This preference for meaning over purpose is consistent 
with Justice Scalia’s announced devotion to original meaning over original 
intent.65
Justice Stevens’s opinion was history-laden as well, leading some to 
declare that he, too, had taken the red pill of originalism.66 As I have discussed in 
other work, that interpretation over-reads his historicism, which is directed not at 
original meaning but at original purpose. So understood, the approach is broadly 
consistent with Justice Stevens’s prior judicial work.67 But even if Justice Stevens 
was a temporary convert in , there is little reason to expect a permanent 
transformation in future Second Amendment cases. Indeed, there is little reason to 
expect a majority of the Court, perhaps including Justice Scalia, to hold firm to 
originalism as Second Amendment doctrine evolves.
Consider first the rule announced in itself. The Court did not 
endorse an unqualified right of individuals to carry guns. Rather, the Court stated 
without analysis that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as 
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications 
on the commercial sale of arms.”68 Moreover, Justice Scalia wrote, the category 
of weapons protected by the Second Amendment is limited to those “in common 
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legislative intent in the statutory context.
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use.” 69 Handguns quintessentially qualify because they are “the most popular 
weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home.”70
Neither of the Court’s prescriptions with respect to two of the big debates 
that will follow the decision—which restrictions and which weapons—rely 
on the original understanding of the Second Amendment. We can expect future 
courts faced with gun control statutes to reason by analogy, in the manner of the 
common law judge, from the Court’s endorsement of felon-in-
possession statutes, bans on carrying in schools and government buildings, and 
commercial regulations. To the chagrin of many in the gun rights community, the 
dozens of lower court opinions rejecting -based challenges to all manner of 
gun control laws, from concealed weapons bans to misdemeanant-in-possession 
laws, have reasoned largely by analogy to Justice Scalia’s list of permissible 
regulations.71 As Judge Copenhaver wrote in —which 
addressed the constitutionality of the federal ban on possessing a gun while using 
or addicted to controlled substances—“ sanctioned some well-rooted, 
public-safety-based exceptions to the Second Amendment right that appear 
consistent with Congress’ determination that those unlawfully using or addicted to 
controlled substances should not have firearms at the ready.”72 Indeed, the case
arising from the changes made to D.C. laws post- , filed by none other than 
Dick Heller, will likely be resolved through careful examination of the 
opinion, not through historical inquiry.73 It is, to coin a phrase, “the common law 
returned.”74
The challenge to the D.C. machine gun ban also may test the second big 
debate likely to emerge from : which weapons may be prohibited. Lower 
courts that have considered whether permits machine gun bans have 
uniformly held that it does. Most prominently, the Eighth Circuit held, relying on 
, that such weapons “fall within the category of dangerous and unusual 
weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use.”75 This has always 
                                                  
69 . at 2817.
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71 Adam Liptak, , N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
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72 United States v. Chafin, No. 2:08-00129, slip op. at 2 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 18, 2008).
73 Amended Complaint, Heller v. District of Columbia, No. 1:08-cv-01289 (D. D.C. 
July 29, 2008). The changes made include a self-defense exception to the handgun ban, a 
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“reasonably perceived threat of immediate harm.”
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been a tricky subject for many Second Amendment originalists. If the original 
purpose behind the Second Amendment was to ensure the effectiveness of the 
militia, keeping the Amendment fresh would seem to support a right to keep and 
bear hand grenades and anti-tank missiles, or at the very least an M16 assault rifle, 
which is standard issue in the United States military. That reading becomes even 
more compelling if one ridicules the argument—as Justice Scalia did—that only 
founding era weapons are protected by the Second Amendment.76 If the scope of 
the Amendment is informed by neither its original purpose nor its original 
meaning, then originalism is doing precious little work in crafting a decision rule. 
Justice Scalia’s solution is to protect the right to keep and bear the modern day 
equivalent of the sorts of weapons used in eighteenth-century militias, namely 
those in common use.77 That is to say, Justice Scalia, who is unwilling to adopt an 
evolving standards of decency test for the meaning of “cruel and unusual 
punishments” in the Eighth Amendment, is downright eager to adopt an evolving 
standards of self-defense test for the meaning of “arms” in the Second 
Amendment.
The other big question in the wake of —whether the Second 
Amendment is incorporated against the states—will likely be answered in the 
affirmative, and sooner rather than later. The majority broadcast that result 
loudly and clearly twice in its opinion. First, in discussing
, which held that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states, 
the Court added a gratuitous footnote noting that “also said 
that the First Amendment did not apply against the States and did not engage in 
the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases.”78 Second, 
the Court mounted its case in favor of an individual rights view by 
referring to the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment in which Senator 
Pomeroy described the right to bear arms for self-defense as an “indispensable . . . 
safeguard[] of liberty,”79 and Senator Nye suggested that the right was implicit in 
United States citizenship.80
As with the questions of “which restrictions” and “which weapons,” the 
incorporation question is not likely to be decided on originalist grounds. As the 
Court’s footnote on indicates, incorporation analysis follows a 
                                                                                                                                          
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98682, at *11 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2008) (holding that the defendant had no 
Second Amendment right to possess a machine gun); . United States v. Perkins, No. 4:08 CR 
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had no Second Amendment right to possess a silencer).
76 , 128 S. Ct. at 2791.
77 . at 2817.
78 . at 2813 n.23.
79 . at 2811 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1182 (1866)).
80 . (citing CONG. GLOB E, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1073 (1866)). The opinion 
mistakenly identifies Senator Nye as a House member.
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doctrinal prescription. The standard formulation mandates selective incorporation 
of those Bill of Rights guarantees that the Court deems “fundamental.”81 This 
route to incorporation is more treacherous than an originalist one. The Court has 
conspicuously refused to decide whether the Fifth Amendment right to a grand 
jury or the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury clears the bar of 
fundamentality;82 what is to prevent five Justices from holding that the Second 
Amendment is significant but not significant? By contrast, the best evidence 
of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it incorporates 
not “fundamental rights” but rather the then-recognized privileges and 
immunities of citizenship.83 There is ample evidence that the right to keep and 
bear arms qualified as of 1866.84
It is natural, of course, that elaboration of a constitutional guarantee 
initially mined through originalism would proceed doctrinally. That pattern is 
evident in the sentencing revolution, whose major constitutional landmarks since 
— 85 and 86—contained not 
a whit of historical analysis. The same is true of the Confrontation Clause cases. 
Although was thoroughly originalist, its progeny 
relied on “our own Confrontation Clause jurisprudence” to define “testimonial” 
statements.87 More recently, the Court relied on original understanding to 
determine that a defendant does not forfeit his Confrontation Clause rights when 
his own wrongful acts cause the unavailability of the witness in question.88 But 
there the Court was merely following its own instruction in to permit 
only those exceptions to the right of confrontation that were recognized at the 
founding.89 We can expect an analogous but even less historically sensitive future 
for ’s posterity: careful, incremental analysis whose essential reference is 
not the founding but rather itself.
III. ORIGINALISM’S FUTURE
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Part II demonstrated that, for all its originalist bells and whistles, 
has a conventional future in store. It will not, in the way of 
or , have a progeny that fundamentally, or even 
subtly, alters the way we think about unearthing constitutional rights.90 Rather, in 
the way of , its future will be the evolutionary stuff of the common law, 
liable over time to slink away from the original understanding of the amendment 
it seeks to interpret. This Part will show that originalist decisions are practically 
bound to follow this pattern in case law, and that their other lifeline—politics—
has practically dried up.
It would be deeply unsettling for originalism never to play nice with stare 
decisis. As the Court has said, “[N]o judicial system could do society’s work if it 
eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it . . . . [T]he very concept of the 
rule of law underlying our Constitution requires such continuity over time that a 
respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”91 Justice Scalia dissented 
vociferously from the application of that sentiment to the case just quoted,92 but in 
his quieter moments he has suggested substantial agreement with the general 
principle. Justice Scalia is what he himself has described as a “faint-hearted” 
originalist, one who recognizes the need to “adulterate [originalism] with the 
doctrine of stare decisis.”93 And his faint-heartedness does not just extend to cases, 
like and , that he agrees with anyway. For example, he seems 
unsympathetic with Justice Thomas’s apparent willingness to restore the
Commerce Clause to its neutered pre-New Deal state.94 Justice Scalia is also 
willing to apply dormant commerce clause jurisprudence even though he regards 
it as “an unjustified judicial invention,”95 and he has swallowed hard and applied 
punitive damages doctrine that he disagrees with.96
This posture is understandable, perhaps even compelled by the norms of 
the judicial role, but faint-hearted originalism by its nature carries an expiration 
date. For originalism of this sort to continue to prosper it needs to feed continually 
                                                  
90 Although heightened means-ends scrutiny for violations of unenumerated liberty rights 
did not originate with , 198 U.S. 45 (1905), is by far its most prominent early 
example. , 356 U.S. 86 (1957), is the font of the “evolving standards of decency” test for 
violations of the Eighth Amendment. . at 101.
91 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992).
92 . at 979 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93 Scalia, note 18, at 861. Justice Scalia was reported to have said publicly in 
response to a question about the difference between himself and Justice Thomas, “I am an 
originalist, . . . but I am not a nut.” TOOB IN, note 38, at 103.
94 Gonazales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
95 , Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1821 (2008) (Scalia, J., 
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96 , Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 443 (2001) (Scalia, 
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on issues of first impression, and those cases are hard to come by. As originalist 
scholar Randy Barnett said of , “This may be one of the only cases in our 
lifetime when the Supreme Court is going to be interpreting the meaning of an 
important provision of the Constitution unencumbered by precedent.”97 Justice 
Stevens would beg to differ as to this characterization of , but the point 
stands that it is rare for the Supreme Court these days to interpret a constitutional 
provision on which it has not already spoken. The Third Amendment comes 
readily to mind, but most issues the Court has not touched are those it considers 
judicially untouchable, such as political questions involving, for example, war 
powers, impeachments, the Guarantee Clause, and the like. Without a steady diet 
of these sorts of cases, the faint-hearted originalist morphs into the cantankerous 
doctrinalist.
Perhaps I have been too quick, however. In the age of the discretionary 
Supreme Court docket, is it not true that Supreme Court constitutional case 
is either one of first impression or a reconsideration—and potential repudiation—
of prior precedent? The typical Court case may not involve an issue like the 
Second Amendment, on which it has said nothing of significance for sixty-nine 
years, but the Court generally is looking to clarify its prior pronouncements and, 
incidentally or intentionally, extend doctrine this way or that. In doing so, it is not 
uncommon for the Court to rely, in part at least, on the original understanding of a 
relevant constitutional provision. But if that is originalism, then we are indeed all 
originalists now and always have been. If instead originalism embraces the notion 
that, notwithstanding precedent, there is something about the original 
understanding, then it remains a rare breed of constitutional interpretive theory.
A difficulty remains. Have we not recently seen originalism in action in 
cases that were not matters of first impression, such as and and 
and ?98 How do we know that an originalist turn is not 
forthcoming in other areas of constitutional law we now believe to be settled, such 
as the selective incorporation doctrine? I would caution against referring to the 
four opinions just mentioned as wholly originalist. It is surely wrong, for example,
to attribute Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in or Justice Breyer’s 
majority vote in to a preference for originalism.99 That said, one must 
admit the possibility that the Court will surprise us with a truly originalist 
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repudiation of prior doctrine, such as the reinvigoration of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.100
But in the nature of surprises, this seems rather unlikely in the near future. 
The reason relates to the nature of faint-hearted originalism. In theory, it means 
that one’s willingness to be originalist varies inversely with the fortitude of the 
doctrinal infrastructure in one’s path, but in Justice Scalia’s hands it has meant 
adhering to originalism in a superficially meandering pattern. More than 
originalism, Scalia’s formalist preference for rules over standards and guidelines 
best explains and .101 Indeed, that preference outright 
predominates over originalism in affirmative action cases.102 This is not so much 
faint-hearted as selective originalism; it is deployed or reserved based not on the 
weight of contrary precedent but on the substantive values of the judge.
What, then, is left for Justice Scalia to be selectively originalist about? As 
discussed, the Second Amendment’s future is solidly doctrinal, and it was one of 
the few areas of constitutional first impression in which judicial review was likely. 
The Court has already nudged some of its federalism jurisprudence in an arguably 
originalist direction,103 but the current Court appears disinclined to go much
further.104 Even for issues on which Justice Scalia might take an originalist 
position—extraterritorial habeas rights, say—on which of those issues are there 
five votes for an originalist opinion? Justice Thomas is a generally reliable 
originalist vote, but Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito both suggested during 
their confirmation hearings that they are originalists,105 and neither has 
demonstrated strong originalist tendencies on the bench. They were nominated 
and confirmed in a climate in which the conservative constitutional cause 
was not abortion or gay rights or school prayer but rather executive power, and, if 
anything, originalism favors a weak executive over a strong one.106 If any other 
theme has emerged from the votes of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, it is 
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an apparent hostility to litigation107—continuing the views of their predecessors—
and on this issue there is no evidence that either Justice is substantially motivated 
by respect for original understandings. Justice Kennedy, the last of the 
majority, has never been an originalist and disagrees with Justice Scalia as often 
as not in divided cases.108  The other four current members of the Court are not 
only non-originalists, but they disagree with Justice Scalia more than they agree 
with him in divided cases.109
Politics, moreover, does not favor originalism. President Obama will 
likely appoint at least two justices, and perhaps three or four if he is elected to a 
second term. It is improbable that any of his federal court nominees will be 
originalists. Obama took office with a strongly Democratic Congress and an 
agenda—fiscal stimulus, energy, education and health care reform, and the 
restoration of the country’s global reputation—that is not obviously destined for 
an originalist constitutional challenge. Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson have 
written that large-scale changes in constitutional doctrine result from so-called 
“partisan entrenchment,” the gradual stocking of the judiciary by members of a 
                                                  
107 For just a sampling of the many closely divided cases in which Roberts and Alito have 
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and Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1081 (2007) (holding that a petition for writ of 
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Act of 1996). Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1960 (2007) (partially 
overruling Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), to hold that factual allegations in a complaint 
must be “plausible”); Andrew M. Siegel, 
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(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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dominant political party.110 Over time, doctrine begins to reflect the ideological 
commitments of that party. President Obama seems temperamentally better suited 
to entrench pragmatists than ideologues.111 The most likely identifiable 
methodological commitment of his judicial nominees will be to the incorporation 
of contemporary international and transnational legal norms into constitutional 
adjudication. That is nothing if not originalism’s opposite.112
Politics and case law are interrelated. As Part I sought to demonstrate, 
originalism is a historically contingent set of rhetorical demands.113 Its recent 
iteration has been an instrument of the restorative politics President Reagan 
inspired, but its juris-generative life may have ended with and the election 
of President Obama. Originalism’s last refuge is the academy, where it continues 
to thrive, albeit in stylized form. It remains interesting to theorize about the 
democratic bona fides of temporally extended commitments,114 to ponder the 
relationship between the authority of original authorial intentions and fidelity to 
the author’s language,115 and to take an external perspective on the process by 
which a jurisprudence succeeds politically through a set of culturally resonant 
ethical claims.116 Moreover, so long as there is a place in the academy for 
historians, and for thoughtful revisionism, there will be room for originalists. But 
for the foreseeable future, the debate over originalism is likely to remain 
academic.
If all I have said is correct, it has important implications for progressive 
lawyering. Democrats currently control two branches of government and have the 
opportunity to shape the third; Republican political elites no longer focus 
centrally on social issues; and originalism is, and will likely remain, “faint-
hearted” in practice. For these reasons, the originalism movement that has 
dominated constitutional discourse for the last three decades is in decline and is 
not likely to produce significant victories in constitutional cases. There has 
nevertheless been significant interest from progressive lawyers and academics in 
emphasizing the liberal implications of a serious examination of original 
understandings. Balkin has prominently advocated a version of “liberal” 
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originalism that manipulates the level of generality at which one assesses the 
original meaning of constitutional provisions.117 James Ryan and Douglas Kendall 
have expressly advocated cooptation of originalist methods to liberal ends.118 And 
Kendall, whose Constitutional Accountability Center is devoted to “fulfilling the
progressive promise of our Constitution’s text and history,” has filed a brief in 
, which challenges Chicago’s gun control laws, 
arguing that the Second Amendment is incorporated against the states by way of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process Clause.119
These efforts emerge from a defensive crouch that, while understandable 
in 2008, may no longer be appropriate in 2009. The substantive progressive 
agenda to be served by an emphasis on originalism might well include continued 
protection for, among other things, abortion rights, affirmative action, and broad 
congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it is 
difficult to imagine what more is to be gained. Dangers, by contrast, include 
legitimizing conservative views on gun control, on a host of social issues, on 
religious establishment, on capital punishment, sentencing policy, and prisoners’ 
rights, and on the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. Reliance on 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the path of incorporation could have 
disturbing implications, moreover, for resident aliens and undocumented 
immigrants, whom the text of the Clause excludes from its protection.
This Essay’s argument implies that, rather than giving originalism the 
oxygen that conservatives are decreasingly likely to supply, progressives are 
better off emphasizing more dynamic rhetoric. When change is “in,” why not 
glorify our Constitution’s impressive ability to adapt to a changing world—to 
embrace its future rather than its past? In an era of global competition, 
foreclosures, bailouts, and outsized executive bonuses, why not argue that our 
Constitution protects a right to a living wage, to a decent education, to adequate 
housing?120 Why not ride an ethical wave away from naked individualism and 
toward mutual responsibility? Why not emphasize that our Constitution is limited 
not by the historical understandings of its framers and ratifiers but by our own 
generation’s ambition, energy, and imagination? Conservatives have 
demonstrated that reorienting constitutional rights toward one’s preferred political 
orientation is a generations-long process. If begun too timidly, the process can and 
will run out of gas.
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This Essay has suggested that, if originalism has won, its victory may be 
bittersweet. The idea that the original understanding of constitutional provisions 
should be dispositive has been at the periphery of constitutional law since at least 
the New Deal era.  In recent years originalism has lived on occasionally in the 
Court’s cases but more stridently in conservative popular culture and judicial 
politics. As the Reagan and Meese judicial agenda fades into history and a 
Democratic political era dawns, the prospects for future originalist triumphs are 
bleak.
For now, at least. We do not know the precise form it will take—history, 
after all, is “merely a list of surprises”121—but we can be sure that originalism 
will be back. It will reemerge, as it always has, when a political constituency 
issues a call for constitutional restoration following an era of constitutional flux. It 
will breathe life into the words of Aldous Huxley, that “from age to age, nothing 
changes and yet everything is completely different.”122
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